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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1999 TERM 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
and 
Jill Zykowski 
CWRU Law School, Class of 2001 
This article summarizes many of the criminal law deci-
sions decided by the United States Supreme Court during 
the last term. 
SEARCH & SEIZURE 
Search Incident to Traffic Citation 
In Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S.Ct. 484 (1 998), a policeman 
stopped Knowles for speeding and issued a citation rather 
than arresting him. The officer then conducted a full search 
of the car without either Knowles' consent or probable 
cause, finding marijuana and a "pot pipe." Because he had 
not been arrested, Knowles argued that the search could 
not be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" ex-
ception. The issue was whether a full search of an automo-
bile pursuant to issuance of a citation for speeding, as au-
thorized by an Iowa statute, violated the Fourth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
search was unconstitutional. In the Court's view, there are 
"two historical rationales for the 'search incident to arrest' 
exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to 
take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evi-
dence for later use at trial. .. . But neither of these underly-
ing rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is 
sufficient to justify the search in the present case." The 
Court remarked that the ''threat to officer safety from issuing 
a traffic citation . . . is a good deal less than in the case of a 
custodial arrest," which involves extended exposure in tak-
ing a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police 
station. In contrast, a routine traffic stop is a relatively brief 
encounter and is more analogous to a Terry stop than to a 
formal arrest. The second justification - the need to dis-
cover and preserve evidence- also did not apply. Once 
Knowles was issued a citation, all the evidence necessary 
to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further ev-
idence of excessive speed was going to be found either on 
the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment 
of the car. 
The Court also stressed that the officer is not without 
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means to protect his or her safety: 
[O]fficers have other, independent bases to search for 
weapons and protect themselves from danger. For ex-
ample, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, 
and any passengers; perform a "patdown" of a driver 
and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that 
they may be armed and dangerous; conduct a "Terry 
patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dan-
gerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon; 
and even conduct a full search of the passenger com-
partment, including any containers therein, pursuant 
to a custodial arrest (citations omitted). 
Automobile Exception 
In Maryland v. Dyson, 19 S.Ct. 2013 (1 999), the defen-
dant was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with 
intent to distribute. A deputy received a tip from a reliable 
source that the defendant had bought drugs and would be 
returning to Maryland in a red Toyota, license number DDY. 
When the police spotted the car with the defendant, a 
known drug dealer, they stopped him and searched the car. 
They did not have a warrant. Twenty-three grams of co-
caine were found. 
On review, the Supreme Court was asked to determine 
whether the Fourth Amendment's "automobile exception" 
has a separate exigency requirement in cases in which 
there is sufficient time to acquire a search warrant. In a per 
curiam opinion, the Court answered in the negative: 
The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to 
secure a warrant before conducting a search. As we 
recognized nearly 75 years ago in Carroll v. United 
States, ... there is an exception to this requirement for 
searches of vehicles. And und,er our established 
precedent, the "automobile exception" has no sepa-
rate exigency requirement. We made this clear in 
United States v. Ross, ... when we said that in cases 
where there was probable cause to search a vehicle 
"a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender. 
Copyright© 1999 Paul Giannelli 
would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a 
warrant has not been actually obtained." (Emphasis 
added.) In a case with virtually identical facts to this 
one (even down to the bag of cocaine in the trunk of 
the car), Pennsylvania v. Labron, ... (per curiam), we 
repeated that the automobile exception does not have 
a separate exigency requirement: "If a car is readily 
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains 
contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police 
to search the vehicle without more" (citations omitted). 
Automobile Exception: Search of Purse 
In Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S.Ct. 1297 (1999), a 
Highway Patrol officer stopped a vehicle for a routine traffic 
stop, at which point the officer noticed a hypodermic syringe 
in the driver's shirt pocket. When the officer asked the dri-
ver why he had the syringe, the driver replied ("with refresh-
ing candor'') that he used it for drugs. The officer then 
searched the car and its contents, including a passenger's 
purse. When the officer found drugs and drug parapherna-
lia, he arrested the passenger, Houghton. 
The Supreme Court upheld the search, ruling that a po-
lice officer with probable cause may search the inside of the 
car and any containers in the car that are capable of con-
cealing the object of the search. Furthermore, "a package 
may be searched, whether or not its owner is present as a 
passenger or otherwise." The Court set forth a two step 
process to determine if there is a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion. The first step is determining ''whether the action was 
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the com-
mon law when the Amendment was framed." If that inquiry 
provides no answer, the Court must "evaluate the search or 
seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness." 
Historically, the permissible scope of a warrantless car 
search "is defined by the object of the search and the 
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it 
may be found." The Court concluded: 
In sum, neither Ross [456 U.S. 798 (1 982)] itself nor 
the historical evidence it relied upon admits of a dis-
tinction among packages or containers based on own-
ership. When there is probable cause to search for 
contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers 
- like customs officials in the Founding era- to ex-
amine packages and containers without a showing of 
individualized probable cause for each one. A passen-
ger's personal belongings, just like the driver's belong-
ings or containers attached to the car like a glove com-
partment, are "in" the car, and the officE:lr has probable 
cause to search for contraband in the car. 
Moreover, drivers may secret drugs in a passenger's purse 
or other container to avoid detection. 
Justice Breyer, concurring, agreed that an officer with 
probable cause may search a car and its contents, but not 
the people in the car A purse that is attached to a person 
may possibly be protected. In this case, the purse was sep-
arated from the owner; therefore, he agreed with the majori-
ty that it may be searched. Justice Stevens, with whom 
Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg joined, dissented: The 
search of a person's purse or briefcase is a serious intru-
sion on privacy and should require specific, individual prob-
able cause. 
Warrantless Seizure of Forfeitable Property 
In Florida v. White, 119 S.Ct. 1555 (1999), police officers 
on three occasions observed White using his car as a 
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means to transport cocaine. Months later the police arrest-
ed him on unrelated charges. The arresting officers, without 
a warrant, seized his automobile in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. Cocaine 
was found in the car, and White was charged with posses-
sion of a controlled substance. 
White raised the following issue: Whether the Fourth 
Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before 
seizing an automobile from a public place when they have 
probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband? 
The Court said, "No." With probable cause, the police do not 
need a warrant to seize a car on public property. 
"Recognition of the need to seize readily movable contra-
band before it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies the 
early federal laws relied upon in Carroll. . .. This need is 
equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its 
contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure." 
The Court went on to note: "Here, because the police 
seized respondent's vehicle from a public area - respon-
dent's employer's parking lot- the warrantless seizure also 
did not involve any invasion of respondent's privacy. Based 
on the relevant history and our prior precedent, we therefore 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not require a war-
rant to seize respondent's automobile in these circum-
stances." 
The dissent argued that since there is nothing illegal 
about owning a car, a warrant should be needed to search 
the car. A warrantless search may intrude on the rights of 
innocent people, and there is no safety risk or fear of loss 
evidence if the police wait to obtain a properly issued war-
rant in this context.. 
Standing 
In Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct. 469 (1 998), a police offi-
cer looked in an apartment window through a gap in a 
closed blind and observed Carter and Johns bagging co-
caine. The defendants were not overnight guest; they were 
there only for their illegal business activity. The issue before 
the Court was whether they had an expectation of privacy 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Without such an ex-
pectation, they did not have standing to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the search. The Court found that the "defen-
dants, who were in another person's apartment for a short 
time ... [not overnight guests] ... had no legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy in the apartment, and, thus, any search 
which may have occurred did not violate their Fourth 
Amendment rights." 
The Court had previously held in Minnesota v. Olson, 495 
U.S. 91 (1990), that an overnight guest in a house had 
standing. Citing Olson and other cases, the Court conclud-
ed: "Thus an overnight guest in a home may claim the pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely 
present with the consent of the householder may not." The 
Court cited a number of factors as supporting its conclu-
sions: (1) the purely commercial nature of the transaction 
engaged in, (2) the relatively short period of time on the 
premises, and (3) the lack of any previous connection be-
tween the defendants and the householder. 
The Court declined to address another issue, leaving it 
for another day: "Because we conclude that respondents 
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, 
we need not decide whether the police officer's observation 
constituted a 'search.'" 
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, con-
curred: "Respondents here were not searched in "their ... 
r? ( 
house" under any interpretation of the phrase that bears the 
remQtest relationship to the well understood meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment." Therefore, they are not protected by 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Justice Ginsberg, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice 
Souter joined, dissented: Whether or not a guest is staying 
the night is irrelevant to expectations of privacy. Nor does 
"the fact that they were partners in crime ... alter the analy-
sis." A private residence is a place where one should be 
able to reasonably expect "privacy free of governmental in-
trusion." 
Media Presence at Search 
In Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (1 999), law enforce-
ment officers entered petitioners' home at around 6:45 a.m. 
in an attempt to execute a warrant to arrest their son. 
Although the warrant did not mention a media ride-along, 
the officers invited a reporter and a photographer to enter 
the home. The media members were not helping the offi-
cers execute the arrest. The suspect was not home, and 
the search was never reported by the media. Petitioners 
subsequently brought a civil rights action. 
The issue raised was whether the officers' actions in 
bringing members of the media to observe and record the 
execution of the arrest warrant violated petitioners' Fourth 
Amendment rights. The Court ruled that a media ride-along 
violates the Fourth Amendment. However, since the state 
of the law was not clearly established at the time of this 
search, the officers were entitled to the defense of qualified 
immunity. 
In the Court's view, "Physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed." The Court elaborated: 
Here, of course, the officers had such a warrant, and 
they were undoubtedly entitled to enter the Wilson 
home in order to execute the arrest warrant for 
Dominic Wilson. But it does not necessarily follow that 
they were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a 
photographer with them. In Horton v. California, [496 
U.S. 128, 140 (1990)], we held "if the scope of the 
search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a valid-
ly issued warrant or the character of the relevant ex-
ception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent 
seizure is unconstitutional without more." While this 
does not mean that every police action while inside a 
home must be explicitly authorized by the text of the 
warrant, see Michigan v. Summers, [452 U.S. 692, 705 
(1981 )] (Fourth Amendment allows temporary detainer 
of homeowner while police search the home pursuant 
to warrant), the Fourth Amendment does require that 
police actions in execution of a warrant be related to 
the objectives of the authorized intrusion, see Arizona 
v. Hicks, [480 U.S. 321, 325 (1 987)]. See also Mary-
land v. Garrison, [480 U.S. 79, 87 (1 987)] ("The pur-
poses justifying a police search strictly limit the per-
missible extent of the search"). Certainly the pres-
ence of reporters inside the home was not related to 
the objectives of the authorized intrusion. Respon-
dents concede that the reporters did not engage in the 
execution of the warrant, and did not assist the police 
in their task. The reporters therefore were not present 
for any reason related to the justification for police 
entry into the home - the apprehension of Dominic 
Wilson. 
Similarly, in Hanlon v. Berger, 119 S.Ct. 1706 (1 999), in 
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executing a search warrant on petitioners ranch, the police 
brought along a media crew from CNN. Again, the Court 
found a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Seizure of Property 
In City of West Covina v. Perkins, 11 9 S.Ct. 678 (1 999), 
local police officers seized property in a home pursuant to a 
valid search warrant. The property belonged to Perkins, the 
home owner, and his family. However, the search warrant 
was issued because Marcus Marsh, a former boarder in the 
Perkins' home, was a suspect. The officers left a "Search 
Warrant: Notice of Service" and an itemized list of the prop-
erty seized. When Perkins was unable to retrieve his be-
longings, he filed suit on due process grounds. The issue 
presented was whether the Constitution required a State or 
its local entities to give detailed and specific instructions to 
owners who seek return of property lawfully seized but no 
longer needed for a police investigation or criminal prosecu-
tion. The Court ruled in favor of the city: "When the police 
seize property for a criminal investigation, ... due process 
does not require them to provide the owner with notice of 
state law remedies." In the Court's view, 
[a] primary purpose of the notice required by the Due 
Process Clause is to ensure that the opportunity for a 
hearing is meaningful. It follows that when law en-
forcement agents seize property pursuant to warrant, 
due process requires them to take reasonable steps 
to give notice that the property has been taken so the 
owner can pursue available remedies for its return. 
Individualized notice that the officers have taken the 
property is necessary in a case such as the one before 
us because the property owner would have no other 
reasonable means of ascertaining who was responsi-
ble for his loss. No similar rationale justifies requiring 
individualized notice of state-law remedies which, like 
those at issue here, are established by published, gen-
erally available state statutes and case law. Once the 
property owner is informed that his property has been 
seized, he can turn to these public sources to learn 
about the remedial procedures available to him. 
The Court cited Federal Criminal Rule 41 (d) as an exam-
ple. All that is required is "a copy of the warrant and a re-
ceipt for the property taken .... The Rule makes no provi-
sion for notifying property owners of the procedures for 
seeking return of their property." 
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
In Mitchell v. U.S., 119 S.Ct. 1307 (1 999), the defendant 
pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine and of dis-
tributing cocaine within 1 ,000 feet of a school or playground. 
' At the sentencing hearing, Mitchell claimed her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and there-
fore remained silent. The case raised two issues: (1) 
whether a guilty plea waives the privilege in the sentencing 
phase of the case, and (2) whether, in determining facts 
about the crime which bear upon the severity of the sen-
tence, a trial court may draw an adverse inference from the 
defendant's silence. 
The Supreme Court ruled for the defendant on both 
issues, holding that a guilty plea does not waive the privi-
lege at sentencing, and a sentencing court may not draw an 
adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify. Tlie 
Court first discussed the "waiver'' rule as it applies at trial: 
It is well established that a witness, in a single pro-
ceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and 
then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination 
w~en questioned about the details. See Rogers v. 
United States, [340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951 )]. The privi-
lege is waived for the matters to which the witness tes-
tifies, and the scope of the "waiver is determined by 
the scope of relevant cross examination," Brown v. 
United States, [ 356 U.S. 148, 154-15 (1958)]. "The 
witness himself, certainly if he is a party, determines 
the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry," id. at 
155. Nice questions will arise, of course, about the ex-
tent of the initial testimony and whether the ensuing 
questions are comprehended within its scope, but for 
now it suffices to note the general rule. 
The justifications for the rule of waiver in the testi-
monial context are evident: A witness may not pick 
and choose what aspects of a particular subject to dis-
cuss without casting doubt on the trustworthiness of 
the statements and diminishing the integrity of the fac-
tual inquiry. 
The Court then distinguished guilty pleas. "There is no con-
vincing reason why the narrow inquiry at the plea colloquy 
should entail such an extensive waiver of the privilege. 
Unlike the defendant taking the stand, who cannot reason-
ably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives him ... an immu-
nity from cross-examination on the matters he has himself 
put in dispute, ... the defendant who pleads guilty puts 
nothing in dispute regarding the essentials of the offense. 
Rather, the defendant takes those matters out of dispute, 
often by making a joint statement with the prosecution or 
confirming the prosecution's version of the facts. Under 
these circumstances, there is little danger that the court will 
be misled by selective disclosure. In this respect a guilty 
plea is more like an offer to stipulate than a decision to take 
the stand." In a later passage, the Court noted: "A waiver 
of a right to trial with its attendant privileges is not a waiver 
of the privileges which exist beyond the confines of the 
trial." 
Moreover, the Court observed that a guilty plea does not 
automatically extinguish any further risk of criminal prosecu-
tion. 'Where a sentence has yet to be imposed, ... howev-
er, this Court has already rejected the proposition that 'in-
crimination is complete once guilt has been adjudicated,' 
Estelle v. Smith, [451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981 )], and we reject it 
again today." In addition, "[w]here the sentence has not yet 
been imposed a defendant may have a legitimate fear of 
adverse consequences from further testimony." 
The Court further remarked: 
[l]t appears that in this case, as is often true in the 
criminal justice system, the defendant was less con-
cerned with the proof of her guilt or innocence than 
with the severity of her punishment. Petitioner faced 
imprisonment from one year upwards to life, depend-
ing on the circumstances of the crime. To say that she 
had no right to remain silent but instead could be com-
pelled to cooperate in the deprivation of her liberty 
would ignore the Fifth Amendment privilege at the pre-
cise stage where, from her point of view, it was most 
important. Our rule is applicable whether or not the 
sentencing hearing is deemed a proceeding separate 
from the Rule 11 hearing, an issue we need not re-
solve. 
Finally, the Court examined the "negative inference" rule. 
The normal rule is that no negative inference from the de-
fendant's failure to testify is permitted. Griffin v. California, 
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380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). The Court explained: 
The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instru-
ment for teaching that the question in a criminal case 
is not whether the defendant committed the acts of 
which he is accused. The question is whether the 
Government has carried its burden to prove its allega-
tions while respecting the defendant's individual rights. 
The Government retains the burde.n of proving facts 
relevant to the crime at the sentencing phase and can-
not enlist the defendant in this process at the expense 
of the self-incrimination privilege. Whether silence 
bears upon the determination of a lack of remorse, or 
upon acceptance of responsibility for purposes of the 
downward adjustment provided in § 3E1.1 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines {1998), is a sep-
arate question. It is not before us, and we express no 
view on it. 
Justice Scalia, with whom the Chief Justice, Justice 
O'Connor, and Justice Thomas joined, dissented: A defen-
dant can use her Fifth Amendment privilege to abstain from 
testifying; however, this does not mean that the defendant is 
protected from the sentencer drawing inferences from her 
silence. The prohibition on the use of defendant's silence 
as demeanor evidence is not found in the text or history of 
the Fifth Amendment. "Conduct which forms a basis for in-
ference is evidence. Silence is often the evidence of the 
most persuasive character." 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
In Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S.Ct. 1887 {1999), the defendant 
was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. 
Three men broke into a home and stole nine bottles of 
liquor, three loaded guns, and a safe. They also robbed a 
small country store, abducting and then killing DeFilippis. 
After robbing two more stores, they were found by the po-
lice and questioned. Lilly did not mention the murder to the 
police, but the other two men said that Lilly was the group 
leader and that he had killed DeFilippis. At trial, Lilly's 
brother, one of the accomplices, invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right, but a tape recording and written tran-
scripts of his statements to the police were admitted into ev-
idence. 
On review, the Supreme Court was required to decide 
whether the accused's Sixth Amendment right of confronta-
tion had been violated. The Court reversed. In addressing 
the issue, the Court adhered to the general framework sum-
marized in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 {1980): A hearsay 
statement is admissible only when (1) the statement falls 
within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or (2) it contains 
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 
The Court then observed: "The decisive fact, which we 
make explicit today, is that accomplices' confessions that in-
culpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted 
exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been de-
fined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence." 
Moreover, there was no particularized guarantee of trust-
worthiness: "It is abundantly clear that neither the words 
that Mark spoke nor the setting in which he was questioned 
provides any basis for concluding that his comments re-
garding petitioner's guilt were so reliable that there was no 
need to subject them to adversarial testing in a trial setting. 
Mark was in custody for his involvement in, and knowledge 
of, serious crimes and made his statements under the su-
pervision of governmental authorities. He was primarily re-
spending to the officers' leading questions, which were 
asked, without any contemporaneous cross-examination by 
adverse parties. Thus, Mark had a natural motive to attempt 
t9 exculpate himself as much as possible." 
rf VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE 
In Chicago v. Morales, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (1999), the defen-
dants moved to dismiss charges based on the city's gang 
loitering ordinance, which prohibited "criminal street gang 
members" from "loitering" with one another or with other 
persons in any public place. During the three years of its 
enforcement, the police issued over 89,000 dispersal orders 
and arrested over 42,000 people for violating the ordinance. 
The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional. 
In the Court's view, "[v]agueness may invalidate a crimi-
nal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may 
fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary 
people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it 
may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement." See also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 
U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966)("1t is established that a law fails to 
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so 
vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain 
as to the conduct it prohibits .... "); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)("No one may be required at peril 
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of 
penal statutes."). In the majority's view, the ordinance failed 
on both counts. · 
Justice Breyer, concurring, wrote that the ordinance had 
the potential of penalizing many innocent people. "To grant 
to a policeman virtually standardless discretion to close off 
major portions of the city to an innocent person is, in my 
view, to create a major, not a 'minor,' 'limitation upon the 
free state of nature." 
The dissent noted that the ordinance did not outlaw loi-
tering; it only authorized the police to order people to dis-
perse. When this dispersal order was not obeyed, and only 
then was the conduct unlawful. Further, the majority was in-
correct in their belief that the ordinance punished the mind-
less act of loitering. The ordinance actually only punished 
the willful act of ignoring a police order to disperse, as such 
there is a mens rea requirement. Because there is no con-
stitutional right to stay in one place, "it is up to the citizens of 
Chicago- not us- to decide whether the trade-off," the 
possibility of some inconvenience for innocent people ver-
sus safer streets for all, was worthwhile. "So long as consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights are not affected, and so long as 
the proscription has a rational basis, all sorts of perfectly 
harmless activity by millions of perfectly innocent people 
can be forbidden." 
GUILTY PLEAS 
In Peguero v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 961 (1999), the 
defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 27 4 months 
imprisonment for cocaine distribution. The trial court, how-
ever, failed to inform him of his right to appeal the sen-
tence. Nevertheless, Peguero was in fact aware of this 
right. The issue was whether the trial court's failure to ad-
vise the defendant of the right to appeal his sentence enti-
tled him to collateral relief. The Supreme Court ruled 
against the defendant: "[A] district court's failure to advise 
the defendant of his right to appeal does not entitle him to 
habeas relief if he knew of his right and hence suffered no 
prejudice from the omission." 
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The Court began its analysis by underscoring the impor-
tance of advising the defendant of the right to appeal: "The 
requirement that the district court inform a defendant of his 
right to appeal serves important functions." First, as soon 
as sentence is imposed, the defendant will often be taken 
into custody and transported elsewhere, making it difficult 
for him to maintain contact with his attorney. The relation-
ship between the defendant and the attorney may also be 
strained after sentencing, due to a defendant's disappoint-
ment over the outcome. Moreover, the attorney concentrat-
ing on other matters may fail to inform the defendant of the 
right to appeal. Second, if the defendant is advised of the 
right by the judge who imposes sentence, the defendant will 
realize that the appeal may be taken as of right and without 
affront to the trial judge, who may later rule upon a motion 
to modify or reduce the sentence. Third, advising the de-
fendant of his right at sentencing also provides him with an 
opportunity to announce his intention to appeal and request 
the court clerk to file the notice of appeal, well before the 
10-day filing period runs. See Fed. Grim. R.32(c)(5) ("If the 
defendant so requests, the clerk of the court must immedi-
ately prepare and file a notice of appeal on behalf of the de-
fendant."); Fed. App. R. 4(b) (establishing 1 0-day period for 
filing appeal, which may be extended for 30 days by district 
court for "excusable neglect''). 
The Court concluded: "These considerations underscore 
the importance of the advice which comes from the court it-
self. Trial judges must be meticulous and precise in follow-
ing each of the requirements of Rule 32 in every case. It is 
undisputed, then, that the court's failure to give the required 
advice was error." However, a violation of Rule 32(a)(2) is 
subject to harmless error review. The Court ruled that be-
cause the "petitioner was aware of his right to appeal, the 
purpose of the Rule had been served and petitioner was not 
entitled to relief." 
DUTY TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE 
In Strickler v. Greene, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999), the victim 
was abducted from a shopping center, robbed, and mur-
dered. At trial an eyewitness, Stoltzfus, gave detailed testi-
mony about the crimes and the defendant's role as one of 
the perpetrators. Information about the witness's earlier 
statements was not disclosed to the defense, thereby rais-
ing a Brady issue. The question before the Court was 
whether the defendant would have been convicted of capital 
murder and received the death sentence if Stoltzfus had not 
testified, or if Stoltzfus had been impeached. Court ruled 
against the accused. 
The Court pointed out that there "are three components 
of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be fa-
vorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or 
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been 
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 
prejudice must have ensued." In this case, the Court found 
that the suppressed evidence was exculpatory. The materi-
als consisted of notes taken by a detective during interviews 
with an eyewitness and letters written by the witness to the 
detective. "They cast serious doubt on [the witness's] confi-
dent assertion of her 'exceptionally good memory."' The 
Court held, however, that the accused had not established 
prejudice. 
The dissent viewed the facts differently: "The withheld 
documents would have shown, ... that many of the details 
Stoltzfus confidently mentioned on the stand (such as 
Strickler's appearance, [the victim's] appearance, the hour 
of the day when the episode occurred, and her daughter's 
all~ged notation of the license plate number of [the victim's] 
car) had apparently escaped her memory in the initial int~r­
view with the police.~· Because confident eyewitness testi-
mony is often a very significant factor in jurors' delibera-
tions, "[o]ne cannot be reasonably confident that not a 
single juror would have had a different perspective after an 
impeachment that would have destroyed the credibility of 
that story." 
Nevertheless, the majority did include a significant com-
ment concerning the relationship between Brady and a 
prosecutor's "open file policy": 'We certainly do not criticize 
the prosecution's use of the open file policy. We recognize 
that this practice may increase the efficiency and the fair-
ness of the criminal process. We merely note that, if a pros-
ecutor asserts that he complies with Brady through an open 
file policy, defense counsel may reasonably rely on that file 
to contain all materials the State is constitutionally obligated 
to disclose under Brady." 
JURY TRIALS 
In Richardson v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1707 (1999); 
the accused was charged with engaging in a "continuing 
criminal enterprise." A jury convicted him, under the statute, 
for leading a gang that distributed heroin, crack cocaine, 
and powder cocaine over a period of years stretching from 
1984 to 1991. At trial, the judge "instructed the jurors that 
they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed 
at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to 
agree as to the particular offenses." 
The issue before the Court was whether the statute's 
phrase "series of violations" referred to one element, or 
whether those words created several elements. The issue 
was important because "[c]alling a particular kind of fact an 
'element' carries certain legal consequences. . . . The con-
sequence that matters for this case is that a jury in a federal 
criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds 
that the Government has proved each element." (Citing 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369-371 (1972) 
(Powell, J., concurring); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 
740,748 (1948); Fed. Grim. R. 31). 
The Court used the following example to illustrate the 
issue: "Where, for example, an element of robbery is force 
or the threat of force, some jurors might conclude that the 
defendant used a knife to create the threat; others might 
conclude he used a gun. But that disagreement- a dis-
agreement about means·- would not matter as long as all 
12 jurors unanimously concluded that the Government had 
proved the necessary related element, namely that the de-
fendant had threatened force." This case, however, was dif-
ferent because the Government's interpretation would im-
pose "punishment on a defendant for the underlying crimes 
without any factfinder having found that the defendant com-
mitted those crimes. If there are federal statutes reflecting a 
different practice or tradition, the Government has not called 
them to our attention, which suggests that any such statute 
would represent a lesser known exception to ordinary prac-
tice." The Court ruled that the jury must unanimously agree 
not only that the defendant committed some "continuing se-
ries of violations" but also that he committed each of the in-
dividual "violations" necessary to make up that "continuing 
series." 
The dissent argued that the majority's "unnecessary at-
omization of the continuing series element disrupts 
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Congress' careful concentration on the ongoing enterprise 
and replaces it with a concentration on perhaps three viola-
tions picked out of the continuing series." The intent of the 
statute is specifically to punish drug kingpins, such as the 
defendant. 
FAILURE TO INSTRUCT: HARMLESS ERROR 
In Neder v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (1999), the de-
fendant was convicted of various false statements, fraud, 
conspiracy, and racketeering offenses. The Supreme Court 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The con-
tested issue was whether the trial judge's omission of an el-
ement of the charge in the jury instructions can be harmles!: 
error. The Court ruled in the affirmative. 
In prior cases, the Court had held that most constitutiona 
errors can be harmless: "If the defendant had counsel and 
was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong pre-
sumption that any other constitutional errors that may have 
occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis." Rose v. 
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). The Court, however, has 
found that some errors are "structural" and thus subject to 
automatic reversal. This limited category includes the fol-
lowing errors: (1) Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 
468 (1997) (complete denial of counsel); (2) Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510 (1927) (biased trial judge); (3) Vasquez v. 
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial discrimination in selec-
tion of grand jury); (4) McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 
(1984) (denial of self-representation at trial); (5) Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (denial of public trial); (6) 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1 993) (defective rea-
sonable-doubt instruction)). 
The error in Neder- a jury instruction that omits an ele-
ment of the offense - differed from these constitutional vi-
olations. Those cases involve errors that "infect the entire 
trial process." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 
(1993). They "necessarily render a trial fundamentally un-
fair." Rose, 478 U.S. at 577. In other words, these errors 
deprive defendants of "basic protections" without which "a 
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle 
for determination of guilt or innocence ... and no criminal 
punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair." ld. at 
577-78. 
In contrast, an instruction that omits an element of the of-
fense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamen-
tally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or 
innocence. r.[T]he omitted element was uncontested and 
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury 
verdict would have been the same absent the error, the er-
roneous instruction is properly found to be harmless." 
The dissent wrote: "[D]epriving a criminal defendant of 
the right to have the jury determine his guilt of the crime 
charged-which necessarily means his commission of 
every element of the crime charged-can never be harm-
less." The question that the majority's opinion raises is 
"why, if denying the right to conviction by jury is structural 
error, taking one of the elements of the crime away from the 
jury should be treated differently from taking all of them 
away-since failure to prove one, no less than failure to 
prove all, utterly prevents conviction." According to the dis-
sent, ''The right to render the verdict in criminal prosecutions 
belongs exclusively to the jury; reviewing it belongs to the 
appellate court." 
DEATH PENALTY 
In Jones v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (1999), the de-
fendant was convicted of kidnapping with death resulting 
and was sentenced to death. The defendant kidnaped 
Private McBride at gunpoint and sexually assaulted her. He 
(J; beat her with a tire iron in the head. When her body was 
'- later found, "the medical examiners observed that large 
pieces of her skull had been driven into her cranial cavity or 
were missing." At the sentencing hearing the jury recom-
mended unanimously that the defendant be sentenced to 
death. The district court agreed and sentenced him to 
death. 
The case raised the issue of whether the defendant was 
entitled to an instruction as to the consequences of jury 
deadlock. The Court ruled that ''the Eighth Amendment 
does not require that the jury be instructed as to the conse-
quences of their failure to agree." Previously, the Court had 
ruled that a jury cannot be "affirmatively misled regarding its 
role in the sentencing process." Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 
U.S. 1, 9 (1994). However, the jury in this case had not 
been affirmatively misled by the trial court's refusal to give 
the accused's proposed instruction. The proposed instruc-
tion had no bearing on the jury's role in the sentencing 
process; it focused on what happens in the event that the 
jury is unable to fulfill its role - when deliberations break 
down and the jury is unable to produce a unanimous sen-
tence recommendation. 
The district court never told the jury that it would give the 
defendant a lighter sentence in the event that the jury could 
not agree. In fact, the court said that it would impose a sen-
tence "authorized by the law," which meant life without leave 
or death. Further, even though the verdict forms may have 
been confusing when looked at independently, in light of the 
entire jury instruction, there should not have been any con-
fusion. "Moreover, even assuming that the jurors were con-
fused over the consequences of deadlock, petitioner cannot 
show the confusion necessarily worked to his detriment. ... 
Where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a de-
fendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error 
actually affected his substantial rights." 
The Court also addressed a void-for-vagueness argu-
ment. "Ensuring that a sentence of death is not so infected 
with bias or caprice is our 'controlling objective when we ex-
amine eligibility and selection factors for vagueness."' 
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994). This re-
view, however, is "quite deferential." As long as an aggra-
vating factor has a core meaning that criminal juries should 
be able to understand, it passes constitutional muster. 
"Assessed under this deferential standard, the factors chal-
lenged here surely are not vague." 
In the dissent's view, "accurate sentencing information is 
an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury's] determination of 
whether a defendant shall live or die." The sentencing infor-
mation in this case seemed to include a nonexistent option, 
namely, that the trial court could impose some type of lesser 
sentence. Therefore, the case should be remanded for a 
new sentencing hearing. 
VENUE 
In United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S.Ct. 1239 
(1999), a drug distributor hired a small group including the 
defendant to find a specific drug dealer and to hold the mid-
dleman captive. The group kidnaped the middleman and 
forced him to travel with them from Texas to New Jersey to 
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New York to Maryland. While in Maryland, the defendant 
came into possession of a gun and held it to the kidnaped 
victim's head. He did not shoot, and the victim later es-
caped. The Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
venue in a prosecution for using or carrying a firearm during 
and in relation to any crime of violence, 18 U.S. C. § 
924(c)(1 ), is proper in any district where the crime of vio-
lence was committed, even if the firearm was used or car-
ried only in a single district. 
Article Ill of the Constitution requires that ''the Trial of all 
Crimes ... shall be held in the State where the said Crimes 
shall have been committed." Art. Ill,§ 2, cl. 3. In addition, 
the Sixth Amendment requires that "in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed." Finally, Federal 
Criminal Rule 18 provides that "prosecution shall be had in 
a district in which the offense was committed." 
The Supreme Court had previously ruled that the "locus 
delicti [of the charged offense] must be determined from the 
nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or 
acts constituting it." United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 
6-7 (1998) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 
699, 703 (1946)). In applying this test, a court must identify 
the conduct constituting the offense (the nature of the 
crime) and then discern the location of the commission of 
the criminal acts. See Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 6-7; Travis v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 631, 635-637 (1961 ); United States 
v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408-409 (1958). 
The Court rejected the argument that the crime was a 
"point-in-time" offense that is committed only in the place 
where the kidnaping and the use of a gun coincide. Reject-
ing this view, several circuits had determined that kidnaping 
is a "unitary" crime. The Supreme Court agreed: "A kidnap-
ing, once begun, does not end until the victim is free. It 
does not make sense, then, to speak of it in discrete geo-
graphic fragments." See also United States v. Lombardo, 
241 U.S. 73 (1916) ("where a crime consists of distinct parts 
which have different localities the whole may be tried where 
any part can be proved to have been done."); Hyde v. 
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 356-367 (1912) (venue proper 
against defendant in district where co-conspirator carried 
out overt acts even though there was no evidence that the 
defendant had ever entered that district or that the conspira-
cy was formed there). 
The Court held that Congress had provided that continu-
ing offenses can be tried "in any district on which such of-
fense was begun, continued, or completed," 18 U.S.C. § 
3237(a). Ev~n though respondent only used the gun in 
rylaryland, he did it "during and in relation to" the continuous 
crime of kidnaping, which occurred in Texas, New York, 
New Jersey, and Maryland. 
CARJACKING 
In Holloway v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 966 (1999), the 
petitioner was found guilty on three counts of carjacking, 
and several related offenses. In each of the carjacking inci-
dents, petitioner's accomplice approached the driver with a 
gun. The accomplice would threaten the driver that he 
would shoot if the keys were not handed over. The accom-
plice testified that he hoped to never use the gun, but would 
if he had to. The only actual violence was one punch, 
caused by a victim's hesitation in giving-up his car. The 
issue was whether the phrase "with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily harm" required the prosecution to 
prove that the defendant had an unconditional intent to kill 
or harm in all events, or whether it merely required proof of 
an intent to kill or harm, if necessary, to effect a carjacking. 
When the actual text does not specify, the meaning of a 
statute depends on the context. The intent may be "condi-
tional" or "unconditional." The purpose of the statute was 
to penalize those who steal cars. It did not seem reason-
able to think Congress amended the statute so that it "would 
no longer prohibit the very crime it was enacted to address 
except in those unusual circumstances when carjackers 
also intended to commit another crime - murder or a seri-
ous assault." 
Justice Scalia dissented. According to traditional 
English, "intent" usually meant something one wants and 
expects to happen; not something one does not want or ex-
pect to happen. Further, there is no basis for finding that 
there is a different meaning of "intent" in criminal law. 
"Conditional intent is no more embraced by the unmodified 
word 'intent' than a sea lion is embraced by the unmodified 
word 'lion."' Justice Thomas also dissented: Without a 
stronger precedent for criminal statutes including "condition-
al intent" as a recognized part of the unmodified term "in-
tent," it should not be presumed that Congress meant to in-
clude both "conditional and unconditional intent" in the 
statute's meaning of intent. 
In Jones v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (1999), Jones 
and two other men robbed two victims. One of Jones's ac-
complices struck one victim on the head and in his ear, 
causing serious bodily damage. Jones forced the other vic-
tim out the victim's car and drove away in the stolen vehicle. 
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The police followed and the chase ended when Jones 
crashed. Jones was told that he faced a maximum of 15-
years, defined by the carjacking statute. However, after 
being found guilty by the jury, the court imposed a 25-year 
sentence on the carjacking charge because one victim suf-
fered serious bodily injury. Jones argued that the 25-year 
sentence for serious bodily injury was invalid because seri-
ous bodily injury is a separate element, ''which had been 
neither pleaded in the indictment nor proven before the 
jury." 
The issue on appeal was whether the federal carjacking 
statute, defined three distinct offenses or a single crime with 
a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them depen-
dent on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of 
charge and jury verdict. The Supreme Court held that the 
provision that established higher penalties for serious bodily 
injury or death set forth additional elements of the offense, 
not mere sentencing considerations. The Court reasoned: 
"[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by 
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions 
arise and by the other of which such questions are avoid-
ed," the Court will choose to avoid the constitutional ques-
tions. The Court looked to the textual structure of the 
statute and other similar statutes, "on the fair assumption 
that Congress is unlikely to intend any radical departures 
from past practice without making a point of saying so." 
From this the majority concluded that§ 2911 (2) and§ 
2911 (3) were distinct offenses. Further, the Court should 
not diminish "the jury's significance by removing control 
over" factual determinations. 
